By Adv. Mpho Justice Khoza

Zimbabwe’s Cabinet has approved draft legislation proposing two major constitutional changes: extending the presidential term from five to seven years and replacing direct presidential elections with selection by Parliament. Framed as governance reforms, the proposals have triggered debate about democratic accountability and the concentration of power. Presidential term length is a core constitutional safeguard. Five-year cycles ensure regular electoral accountability and limit prolonged incumbency.
Extending the term to seven years would reduce the frequency with which voters can assess and replace leadership. Critics argue that, without stronger institutional checks, longer terms risk entrenching executive authority and weakening oversight. The second proposal would shift the election of the president from direct popular vote to parliamentary selection. While such systems operate in parliamentary democracies, Zimbabwe functions under a presidential model in which the executive derives legitimacy directly from voters.

Transferring that mandate to Parliament would significantly alter the structure of executive authority and could consolidate power within party structures. If applied retroactively, the amendments could extend President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s tenure to 2030. This has intensified concerns about constitutional neutrality — the principle that reforms should strengthen institutions rather than benefit incumbents. Opposition figures and legal commentators argue that altering foundational provisions without broad public endorsement risks eroding public trust and undermining constitutional legitimacy.

Regional experience underscores the stakes. In Uganda, the removal of presidential term limits enabled extended incumbency but drew criticism over institutional weakening. Rwanda amended its constitution to permit extended tenure for its president, maintaining political stability while raising questions about long-term democratic resilience. By contrast, South Africa has maintained clear presidential term limits since 1996, a consistency often cited as reinforcing constitutional stability.

Supporters of Zimbabwe’s proposals argue that longer terms and parliamentary election could reduce electoral volatility and promote continuity. Critics contend that democratic legitimacy depends on regular, direct public mandate and firm safeguards against personalisation of power. Beyond the substance of the amendments lies the question of process. Constitutional reform requires transparency, inclusive consultation and, where necessary, direct public approval.

Without broad consensus and clear procedural compliance, such changes risk being viewed as partisan manoeuvres rather than institutional strengthening. Zimbabwe’s lawmakers now face a pivotal choice: whether these amendments will enhance governance stability or mark a shift toward executive entrenchment. The durability of the country’s constitutional order will depend not only on the text of the reforms, but on the principles and processes that shape them.

Adv. Mpho Justice Khoza