Opinion piece by Dr Mabutho Shangase, senior lecturer in Political Studies and International Relations at the North-West University (NWU)
The emergence of anti-illegal immigration movements such as Operation Dudula, and more recently, March and March, represents a significant moment in the democratic trajectory of South Africa.
These formations, rooted in grassroots mobilisation, have been embraced by the public as vehicles through which citizens articulate grievances relating to immigration, public services and state accountability. Their rise and the response of the state raise a fundamental democratic question: to what extent does the “will of the people” shape public policy in post-apartheid South Africa?
To attribute the present tensions solely to anti-immigration sentiment constitutes not only a substantial oversimplification but also fails to capture the underlying dynamics and the full gravity of the current situation. Who possesses ultimate sovereignty in the relationship between the state and its citizenry, and can the state act in contravention of the expressed will of the people?
Current developments reflect not merely episodic protest, but a deeper contestation over representation, and the meaning of democracy itself. In contemporary South Africa, immigration has developed into a complex and multidimensional phenomenon that has illuminated significant gaps in, and neglect of, considerations relating to national sovereignty, national security, nationhood and territorial integrity. In so doing, it has come to implicate, in a profound and constitutive manner, the very conceptual underpinnings and practical functioning of democracy itself.
The immigration issue therefore cannot be reduced solely to socio-economic competition for employment opportunities and participation in the informal economy, nor to debates over the allocation of scarce resources in areas including healthcare, education, crime control and housing.
Democratic South Africa emerged as a polity formally constituted on the basis of popular sovereignty and an implied social contract. The cohesion of the body politic was cultivated through practices of solidarity and a collective ethos, encapsulated in the political slogan, “an injury to one is an injury to all”, which functioned as a unifying normative principle during the struggle years.
Over time, South Africa has been reconfigured into a common, shared, open-ended and highly contested socio-political space in which the substantive meaning of citizenship has been significantly compromised, as citizens and foreign nationals increasingly compete over access to the same territorial, economic and social resources.
If we reconsider the notion of the popular will – widely regarded as a foundational principle of democratic governance – it becomes apparent that the historical and central tenet of liberation ideology in South Africa, summarised in the maxim “the people shall govern”, has been substantively eroded. This erosion is manifested in the gradual concentration of decision-making authority in the hands of a political elite, who increasingly arrogate to themselves the prerogative to determine what is deemed most appropriate and good for society.
Since 1994, South Africa has become a major destination for migrants from across the African continent and beyond, driven by relative economic stability and opportunity. Migration initially proceeded with limited public scrutiny. However, tensions intensified over time, culminating in the May 2008 “xenophobic violence”, during which at least 62 people were killed and tens of thousands were displaced.
The 2008 events marked a turning point in public discourse, entrenching the term “xenophobia” in both academic and policy debates. Subsequent outbreaks of violence in later years underscored the persistence of tensions in economically marginalised communities, often linked to unemployment, inequality and competition over limited resources. None of these developments have curtailed the continued large-scale and uncontrolled influx of migrants into South Africa.
In parallel, the South African state introduced mechanisms to regularise certain migrant populations. Notably, the Zimbabwean Special Permit (later ZEP), first introduced in 2009 and repeatedly extended, sought to manage large inflows of Zimbabwean nationals following economic and political crises in that country. These measures reflect an ongoing attempt to balance humanitarian considerations with administrative and political pressures.
Against this background, movements such as Operation Dudula and March and March have emerged as influential actors in the immigration debate. These organisations are community-driven initiatives advocating stricter immigration enforcement and prioritisation of South African citizens in access to resources and opportunities.
Supporters view these movements as expressions of grassroots democracy and civic accountability, particularly in contexts where state institutions are perceived as ineffective in regulating migration and delivering services. Conversely, the government has sought to delegitimise these movements by characterising them as vigilante groups. However, these efforts have been largely ineffective, as the public has generally embraced these formations and increased its support for them. Meanwhile, inadequate law enforcement and on-going normalisation of illegal immigration facilitate its persistence and recurrence.
This polarisation reflects a broader ideological divide between what may be termed a “pro-immigration ecosystem” of civil society actors, academics and political parties, and a “sovereigntist” perspective emphasising national control, citizenship and prioritisation of locals.
The salience of immigration in public discourse cannot be detached from South Africa’s socio-economic conditions. High unemployment, inequality and strained public services have contributed to perceptions of competition between citizens and foreign nationals, particularly in townships and informal settlements.
Specific issues frequently cited in public debates include pressure on public healthcare and education systems, housing shortages and the informal economy. In addition, criminal economies – such as illegal mining and illicit trade – have intensified public concern. Illegal mining, for instance, is closely linked to organised crime networks and has significant economic and security implications. Similarly, the illicit cigarette trade has expanded dramatically, accounting for more than half of the market in recent years and resulting in substantial fiscal losses.
While these phenomena are complex and multi-causal, they are often interpreted in public discourse through the lens of illegal immigration, contributing to heightened tensions and political mobilisation.
The response by the state to anti-illegal immigration mobilisation has been characterised by a combination of securitisation and discursive contestation. The government has deployed law enforcement to maintain order and prevent violence. These dynamics highlight a central tension within democracy: the balance between popular sovereignty and the rule of law. While democratic governance requires responsiveness to citizens’ concerns, it is also constrained by constitutional commitments.
The absence of formal mechanisms – such as referenda or large-scale consultations – specifically addressing public attitudes towards immigration has further complicated this terrain, feeding perceptions among some constituencies that their views are marginalised. In other democracies, the government would, by this time, likely have called a snap election and dissolved parliament, rather than deploying the security apparatus against citizens engaging in peaceful demonstrations in exercising their constitutionally protected rights.
As the government increasingly disregards public concerns regarding immigration, negative attitudes towards immigration have intensified and become more entrenched. While earlier tensions often centred on jobs, social services and service delivery, contemporary debates increasingly invoke broader themes of national identity, sovereignty and self-determination.
Movements such as March and March articulate a vision in which citizens demand a state that “primarily serves its own people”, framing this as a normal expectation in the international system of nation-states. Conversely, critics warn that such framing risks undermining constitutional values and fostering exclusionary nationalism. This shift signals a deeper ideological contest: not merely over policy outcomes, but over the foundational principles of the South African polity.
The current moment represents a critical test for South African democracy. At its core lies a fundamental question: how should the “will of the people” be interpreted, mediated and balanced in a constitutional order committed to rights, equality and inclusion? The incumbent government is unlikely to acknowledge that, over an extended period, there was a sustained failure to fulfil its governance responsibilities, and that large-scale immigration, in broad terms, should not have been permitted after 1994. Instead, there is a discernible deficit of accountability on the part of the ANC, accompanied by a strong path dependence and an escalation of commitment to an erroneous post-apartheid trajectory of misgovernance, with citizens disproportionately bearing the adverse consequences and now being subjected to intimidation through the deployment of security forces.
Anti-illegal immigration movements, whatever their limitations, reflect genuine grievances rooted in socio-economic conditions and perceptions of state failure. The ongoing contestation over immigration in general thus constitutes, in effect, a struggle over the “soul” of South Africa – one that will likely shape the political trajectory of the country in the years to come.
As South Africa exhibits increasing political fragmentation and resistance to recognising the expressed will of the electorate, the legitimacy of its democratic system is likely to be progressively eroded. Political elites and their affiliated networks appear to have significantly deviated from, or largely neglected, the principles and obligations traditionally associated with the social contract.
Ultimately, as in any other polity, governance will be exercised by the populace – the realisation of this principle is merely a matter of time. Irrespective of the resources, influence and organisational capacity of political elites and their associated networks, no state or government can sustainably prevail in prolonged conflict with a populace that perceives itself to be existentially threatened and mobilises in defence of its fundamental rights and survival.
Dr Mabutho Shangase
