Uncertainty springs eternal in the South African political landscape, or so it would seem. The Government of National Unity (GNU) has yet to find its feet, and cohesion has not been one of its hallmarks.
According to Professor Kedibone Phago, Director of the School for Government Studies at the North-West University (NWU), there is much to be done if the country is to be defined by its successes rather than its failures.
The state of SOEs: A broken backbone
State-owned enterprises are the backbone of the South African economy, but that backbone is fractured. Nowhere is this more evident than at Transnet, which suffered severe damage from the era of state capture under former President Jacob Zuma.
“There is no doubt that the government needs to focus on reviving SOEs to fix the economy,” says Phago. He stresses that one of the first steps should be a comprehensive skills audit, followed by a clear roadmap for skills development.
“A structured partnership with universities and TVET colleges is crucial for medium- to long-term planning. This would ensure a steady pipeline of technical expertise feeding into both SOEs and local government structures.” Phago also suggests that collaborations should extend to the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) and the Ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA).
Will the GNU be a short-lived alliance?
How long will the GNU last? That remains the burning question. The current unity government, led by President Cyril Ramaphosa, was a necessary response to the ANC’s failure to secure an outright majority in the last elections.
“It is in South Africa’s best interest for the GNU to hold until the next elections,” says Phago. “With Ramaphosa at the helm, there’s a chance that the GNU could endure, but the real threat lies within the ANC itself.”
The party’s elective conference, expected before 2029, could be a turning point. If Ramaphosa decides not to run for a third term as ANC president, history suggests that internal party battles could bring his tenure to a premature end. “We have seen this before. Both Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma were ousted due to ANC leadership struggles,” Phago notes. Leftist opposition forces, particularly the EFF and MK parties, are watching closely, waiting for an opportunity to unseat him.
What kind of governance does South Africa need?
With a diverse population and a young, vibrant workforce, South Africa needs pragmatic governance. However, the ideological tug-of-war between left-wing and centrist policies continues to shape the country’s political landscape.
“A pragmatic approach must be entrenched,” Phago argues. “The left may call it neoliberalism, but the reality is that South Africa has to align itself with global financial systems such as the World Bank and the IMF.”
The challenge, he says, is that leftist rhetoric in South Africa often lacks substance. “To sustain social grants, free education, and other welfare programmes, the government needs to broaden its tax base. Without this, left-wing policies become little more than empty slogans.” Corruption scandals such as the Arms Deal, Travelgate and State Capture have further exposed the hypocrisy of some so-called progressive leaders.
The ANC’s prospects for 2029
With declining support, the ANC faces an uphill battle ahead of the 2029 elections. However, Phago sees some signs of stabilisation. “Early polls suggest that both the ANC and the DA have maintained their support base since the formation of the GNU.”
The 2026 local government elections will be a crucial test. “The black middle class in urban centres will be a key demographic to watch,” he notes. In addition, the ANC’s elective conference in 2026 will provide insights into the party’s internal power struggles.
The rise and fall of opposition parties
The MK Party, founded by Zuma loyalists, is still in its infancy and its leadership instability threatens its future. “The rift between its secretary general and Duduzile Zuma could determine whether the MKP retains its 14% support base,” Phago predicts. Without internal cohesion, the party’s future is uncertain.
Meanwhile, the EFF appears to be in decline. “The departure of Floyd Shivambu and Mbuyiseni Ndlozi has left a significant leadership vacuum,” Phago observes. “So far, Julius Malema has not demonstrated a clear strategy to keep the party viable.”
The DA, on the other hand, has adopted a two-pronged strategy within the GNU. “By staying in government while simultaneously challenging policies in the courts, the DA seeks to retain white voters who might drift to the Freedom Front Plus, while also appealing to the black middle class,” Phago explains. If the ANC elects a controversial or corruption-tainted leadership at its next conference, the DA could gain further traction among urban voters.
The emergence of a centrist force?
Given South Africa’s current political fragmentation, could a centrist force emerge as a viable alternative? Phago believes such forces are already visible within the GNU, but their survival is uncertain.
“The challenge is to sustain them,” he warns. “Paul Mashatile, the current deputy president of the ANC, does not represent this centrist shift. Until we see who succeeds Ramaphosa, it’s too early to say whether a pragmatic governance model will take hold.”
For now, the so-called progressive forces remain weak and divided. “If they were a real threat, we would have seen them take control of a municipality in Gauteng or KwaZulu-Natal by now,” says Phago.
The road ahead
South Africa’s political and economic landscape remains volatile. The survival of the GNU depends on Ramaphosa’s leadership, while the ANC’s ability to reverse its declining fortunes will be tested in the coming years. As Phago puts it: “The next few years will determine whether South Africa moves towards pragmatic governance or remains mired in ideological battles that do little to address its pressing economic challenges.”
Professor Kedibone Phago
